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This paper explores the influence of economic variables in Chilean presidential
elections. We use a panel where the dependent variable corresponds to the share of the
vote obtained by the incumbent at a municipal level in the presidential elections of 1989,
1993 and 1999. We focus on the unemployment rate and the output-gap and find that
both have a significant influence on the vote. The estimations also indicate that variables
such as the crime rate, the poverty rate and the political coalition of the mayor in each
municipality have an influence on the vote.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how macroeconomic performance has
influenced the presidential elections in Chile since the return of democracy in 1989.
Since the plebiscite of 1988, in which the people voted against Pinochet staying in power
for another eight years, there have been three presidential elections in Chile. All of them
have been won by the coalition currently in power (the “Concertación”), but the margin
of the victory seems to be related to macroeconomic conditions. The most contested
election, the one in 1999 in which there was a second round, took place while the
country was in its first recession in sixteen years. In that year, GDP fell 0.8% and the
unemployment rate climbed from 6.2% in 1998 to 9.7% in 1999.
In an influential paper on this subject, Kramer (1971) concluded that election
outcomes depend on economic changes in the year of the election. In particular, he
showed that economic fluctuations are important influences on congressional elections
where economic upturns will help the candidate of the incumbent party and economic
declines will benefit the opposition. Stigler (1973) argues that voters know that the
government cannot push the economy permanently off its long-term path, hence they
neither reward nor punish short-term deviations from this path.  In his view, the
economic variables that affect voting relate more to income distribution aspects rather
than to short-term macroeconomic fluctuations.
Fair (1978, 1996) uses a model in which each voter considers his/her expected
utility under the two possible scenarios: what it will be if the Republican candidate wins
and what it will be if the Democratic candidate wins. The expectations are related to
what the government did while it was in power.  He uses the time-series information for
the presidential election in the USA between 1916 and 1976 and economic variables for
the period 1889-1976. His basic conclusion is that the voters use mostly economic
information from the year of the election. The two most important economic variables
that affect the results of  the elections are unemployment and economic growth.
Peltzman (1990) uses a principal agent model to evaluate the use of information
in the “political market.” Using state-level election returns for presidential, senatorial
and gubernatorial elections from 1950-88, he finds that the market is efficient in the
sense that it uses information efficiently. It differentiates, for instance, between
permanent and transitory income, expected and unexpected inflation, and does notDOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 295 3
discard relevant information. In Peltzman (1992), the view that voters favor the
incumbents who increase public spending before the elections is challenged. He finds--
using the same data set as in his 1990 paper--that voters penalize federal and state
spending growth.
There have been at least a couple of studies on elections and macroeconomic
performance in Chile. Engel & Araos (1989) estimate the effect of the unemployment
rate on the results of the plebiscite of 1988. They use data for the 28 largest cities and
conclude that the unemployment rate plus the historical vote explain half of the
difference in voting among cities. Villena (2003) uses a panel with the results by
municipality of the elections in 1993, 1997 and 2001 for the lower house of congress. He
finds that the business cycle is not key although the unemployment rate helps to explain
the results to some degree. According to his estimations, the level of income is the key
variable, with the poor voting for the center-left coalition. This implies the somewhat
uneasy conclusion that as the country becomes richer, the likelihood of the center-left
coalition becoming elected declines. Nor is it consistent with the evidence of some
polls1 that indicate that, with the exception of the very rich, income seems to be
unrelated to voting behavior in Chile.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we present some
preliminary evidence. Section three contains a description and an analysis of the data
and the methodology. The results are analyzed in section four. Section five concludes.
2.  PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE
Our dependent variable is the incumbent’s vote as a percentage of total vote. The
data are obtained from the Chilean electoral service. We use a panel with three periods
(the elections in 1989, 1993 and 1999) and 228 municipalities. To look more carefully at
our question of interest, we decided to analyze presidential elections at the Chilean
municipal level. We decided to do so because there is large variation in electoral
performance throughout the country, thus we would obtain a great variation in our data
set by including the cross-sectional dimension of the data.  In fact, from table 1, which
                                                                
1 Centro de Estudios Públicos (2004).4 BUSINESS CYCLE AND POLITICAL ELECTION OUTCOMES
shows descriptive statistics of electoral performance by regions, we can conclude that
there is large variation in the data between and within regions and over time in a given
region.  In addition, we decided to focus on presidential elections rather than elections of
congressional representatives or mayors because those representatives do not have the
same power as the president to determine economic policies. Thus, it is more likely that
people evaluate economic policies in presidential elections.
Figure 1 shows the unemployment rate and the incumbent’s vote. For the 1999
election, the numbers are for the second round of the presidential election. It is seen that
the increase in the vote of the incumbent in 1993 and the decline in 1999 coincide with
movements of the unemployment rate in the opposite direction. GDP growth and the
incumbent’s vote are depicted in figure 2. The decline in the rate of growth in 1999 also
matches a decline in the vote obtained by the incumbent. In figure 3, we have
constructed a variable, which is the difference between actual and trend GDP (the output
gap). A positive number implies that the economy is in the upper part of the business
cycle and a negative number that it is in the lower part of the business cycle. It is
apparent that the recession of 1999 is somewhat related to the decline in the vote for the
incumbent’s candidate.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 295 5
Region Year Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
1989 10 48.86 12.47 30.22 66.46
1993 10 46.00 10.59 25.80 58.98
1999 10 38.89 12.66 15.33 51.41
1989 9 27.89 6.36 21.47 39.53
1993 9 56.94 5.97 47.79 66.87
1999 9 59.13 4.68 53.48 65.22
1989 9 31.69 6.86 19.95 46.86
1993 9 59.61 3.44 53.03 63.33
1999 9 60.90 4.86 53.24 70.68
1989 15 31.74 9.63 21.14 54.04
1993 15 62.56 4.68 54.82 71.86
1999 15 62.11 9.50 47.60 78.29
1989 37 31.91 9.02 19.52 61.92
1993 37 59.63 6.72 46.22 71.09
1999 38 a/ 48.64 7.67 34.70 62.72
1989 33 31.35 5.15 20.75 42.31
1993 33 64.48 3.94 55.22 71.14
1999 33 51.76 4.56 42.94 62.51
1989 29 30.47 5.28 21.50 42.89
1993 29 60.64 6.17 42.85 71.26
1999 30 b/ 50.55 7.41 37.44 62.21
1989 49 30.02 10.05 10.69 54.72
1993 49 61.57 6.36 48.17 74.80
1999 52 c/ 51.11 11.14 26.71 73.04
1989 30 31.50 9.07 19.54 59.75
1993 30 54.08 7.88 37.08 67.54
1999 31 d/ 40.68 8.01 23.35 56.84
1989 42 33.69 8.57 19.12 56.74
1993 42 54.48 6.75 35.49 65.39
1999 42 44.38 8.42 24.45 60.05
1989 10 44.10 15.24 25.09 76.43
1993 10 52.09 3.77 46.17 55.51
1999 10 40.97 9.17 22.95 54.31
1989 11 46.77 19.28 27.55 86.67
1993 11 55.64 13.42 31.43 67.16
1999 11 44.93 14.97 13.33 59.73
1989 51 32.07 8.78 20.12 63.38
1993 51 58.68 8.25 29.40 69.66
1999 52 e/ 50.48 8.23 24.10 61.66
a/ It includes "Con Con" 
b/ It includes "San Rafael" 
c/ It includes the following counties: "Chiguayante", "Chillan Viejo" & "Sn. Pedro de la Paz"
d/ It includes "Padre Las Casas" 
e/ It includes "Padre Hurtado" 
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3.  METHODOLOGY AND ESTIMATIONS
The question to answer in this paper is how variables such as the unemployment
rate and the output gap affect the vote of the governing coalition in presidential
elections.  As there have been only three elections in Chile since the return to
democracy, we have to use a panel with the data for the vote in each election by
municipality. We use the unemployment rate and the output gap as the principal
macroeconomic variables. As in Chile there are no inflation data either by municipality
or by region, we could not include inflation in our estimations. We also control by
variables such as the crime rate, poverty, whether the mayor belongs to the government’s
coalition and by other demographic variables.
As mentioned above, we have data on presidential elections by county. We  also
obtained economic and demographic data by county from the 1990,1992 and 1998
Survey of Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Chilean Population (CASEN). These
data correspond to a representative survey of the Chilean population. The survey is taken
among approximately 200,000 individuals per year. It allows us to obtain data related to8 BUSINESS CYCLE AND POLITICAL ELECTION OUTCOMES
demographics, such as the average age of voters and the fraction of female voters; the
fraction of the population considered to be  poor (who are below the poverty line); and
the unemployment rate. We do not have data on the GDP by county, hence we use the
information by region. The variable used is the output gap, defined as the deviation of
GDP from its trend (the trend measured by means of the Hodrick Prescott filter).
Macroeconomic variables, such as the output gap and the unemployment rate, are
included since the population may punish incumbents–by decreasing the likelihood of
voting for them--when there is a poor economic performance that might indicate a set of
bad economic policies. Nonetheless, it could be argued that in a small open economy
like Chile, in which a significant part of the variability in the economic variables
depends on external shocks rather than on incumbent´ s economic decisions, voters do
not penalize the incumbent if the economy is performing badly since they understand
that the macroeconomic performance depends only marginally on economic policies. In
that case, the vote of the incumbent is not affected by business cycle variables but by
other variables, such as demographics (average age of the population in the county and
the fraction of female voters in each county), historical preferences (which refer to
aspects such as family background, which undoubtedly influences individual preferences
and which, in a fixed-effect estimation, is captured precisely by the fixed effect at a
municipal level) and/or other political variables (such as the political party of the mayor
in that municipality).
The preliminary evidence presented in the previous section seems to support the
view  that economic variables do affect the vote in political elections. Cerda and Vergara
(2005) look at the same evidence for Chile, but referring to congressional and municipal
data, and they confirm a relationship between the incumbent’s vote and economic
variables.
To proceed with the econometric analysis, we hypothesize the following
relationship:
(1) '' it0ititiit ElectXZ abgmn =++++
Where the subscripts indicate the ith municipality and the tth year. The variable  it Elect
is the incumbent´s electoral performance while Xit is a set of economic variables and Zit
is the set of other non-economic variables determining it Elect . In Z it, we include
demographics, plus other political variables that might influence people´s vote.  Finally,DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 295 9
i m  is a municipality-fixed effect and  it n  is a well-behaved error term distributed as
2 iid(0,). n s
The CASEN survey does not contain other economic variables of interest at the
county level, such as GDP growth rate or the inflation rate. To deal with this problem,
we obtained data on GDP by Chilean regions from the National Accounts. However,
there are no data on inflation rates, even by regions. Thus, as variables measuring
economic performance, we include the unemployment rate at the municipal level and a
measure of output in the output gap at the regional level. Finally, to control other
political considerations, we obtained from the Chilean electoral service the political
party of the mayor in office.
One of the two economic variables in which we are interested is the
unemployment rate. As seen in Table 2, the dispersion of unemployment rates
throughout the years in the municipalities considered is significant. The next step is to
extrapolate the effect of this variable and the output-gap, controlling  by the other
variables that may affect political vote.10 BUSINESS CYCLE AND POLITICAL ELECTION OUTCOMES
Region Year a/ Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
1989 2 7.94 3.15 5.71 10.16
1993 2 3.47 0.43 3.17 3.77
1999 10 4.40 2.73 0.26 9.61
1989 2 9.96 2.75 8.01 11.91
1993 7 6.88 2.67 4.19 11.79
1999 6 9.02 3.41 5.36 13.83
1989 1 6.90 - 6.90 6.90
1993 9 6.74 3.94 2.00 11.92
1999 9 11.14 4.89 4.68 20.08
1989 3 14.13 4.98 8.79 18.63
1993 3 5.18 0.24 5.01 5.45
1999 15 10.00 3.37 5.25 16.19
1989 2 13.58 4.84 10.16 17.00
1993 6 5.63 2.74 1.99 8.45
1999 35 9.35 3.16 3.54 18.28
1989 3 9.66 0.91 8.79 10.60
1993 3 3.85 1.68 2.59 5.75
1999 13 8.89 2.44 4.29 14.07
1989 1 15.54 - 15.54 15.54
1993 1 7.46 - 7.46 7.46
1999 10 9.51 2.67 4.83 12.43
1989 3 12.56 0.48 12.00 12.84
1993 49 7.33 3.93 1.10 20.57
1999 22 15.28 4.69 8.60 27.95
1989 1 6.68 - 6.68 6.68
1993 1 4.47 - 4.47 4.47
1999 16 10.14 3.88 3.39 14.71
1989 3 10.67 3.81 8.17 15.05
1993 3 5.77 0.44 5.27 6.10
1999 4 10.29 2.41 8.39 13.81
1989 2 6.18 0.05 6.14 6.21
1993 2 5.36 0.40 5.08 5.65
1999 2 4.61 2.46 2.88 6.35
1989 1 6.48 - 6.48 6.48
1993 1 3.03 - 3.03 3.03
1999 3 7.66 2.15 5.56 9.85
1989 25 9.26 3.02 2.97 13.09
1993 51 4.95 1.87 1.20 8.81
1999 52 9.37 3.33 2.22 18.18
a/ Data on 1989 was obtained from de 1990 CASEN, data on 1992 was obtained from the 1992 















We initially estimated our panel data using a random-effect GLS method. In our
regression model, we included the unemployment rate and the square of theDOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 295 11
unemployment rate to capture a potential non-linear effect of this variable. We expect
the overall impact of the unemployment rate to be negative, but possibly the squared
term might be positive to capture the non-linear effect. Column 1 of table 3 shows the
result when we do not control by other variables. Columns 2 to 6 provide the sensitivity
analysis as we introduce other variables. Even though the results in this table are
consistent with the effects we expected for each of the variables included, there is a
pattern that concerns us: the magnitude of the parameters of both unemployment and the
unemployment square decreases as we introduce new variables in our model.
Furthermore, the Hausman test is rejected in all the specifications, denoting a rejection
of the hypothesis of orthogonality between the municipality fixed effect and the
explanatory variables, thus invalidating the random-effects GLS estimation.  In
economic terms, we can interpret this as confirming that history is important in
explaining the vote in presidential elections. Said otherwise, there are counties that are
historically more inclined to vote for a given political party. In fact, this would be
perfectly consistent with public opinion feelings, such as that the north is more leftist
while certain parts of the south are more conservative.
To deal with the orthogonality problem, we next estimated a fixed-effect model
(Table 4). As this model excludes the fixed effect component, any potential endogeneity
between explanatory variables and the fixed effect is eliminated. In this estimation, after
introducing some variables, the coefficient of unemployment and the unemployment rate
squared stabilize. The same occurs in the case of the crime rate, output gap and poverty.
The signs of all variables are correct (except that of the mayor), yet some of them are not
significant.12 BUSINESS CYCLE AND POLITICAL ELECTION OUTCOMES
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6
-1.3042 -1.7099 -1.1019 -0.9342 -0.7627 -0.7075
(-2.53)** (-3.63)** (-3.59)** (-3.26)** (-2.53)** (-2.36)**
0.0599 0.0692 0.0453 0.0412 0.0387 0.0354
(2.47)** (3.19)** (3.28)** (3.25)** (3.03)** (2.78)**
Demographics NO YES YES YES YES YES
-0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0030







R2 Overall 0.0166 0.2796 0.1609 0.1637 0.1693 0.2604
Within 0.0803 0.3773 0.3616 0.4844 0.4846 0.4538
Between 0.0009 0.103 0.0885 0.0753 0.0886 0.1862
Observations 384 384 335 335 332 332
Groups 228 228 228 228 227 227
77.6 70.89 90.93 93.15 82.78
Prob 0.00 Prob 0.00 Prob 0.00 Prob 0.00 Prob 0.00
Mayor
Poverty
Table 3: Random effect GLS estimation
Dependent variable: electoral votes, %, by county
Demographics include average age, average schooling, average schooling squared, fraction of females. T 






Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6
-4.0349 -2.9120 -1.7509 -1.5293 -1.5242 -1.5262
(-4.95)** (-4.31)** (-4.96)** (-4.87)** (-4.56)** (-4.53)**
0.1132 0.0824 0.0681 0.0630 0.0634 0.0635
(3.03)** (2.73)** (4.61)** (4.82)** (4.78)** (4.74)**
Demographics  NO YES YES YES YES YES
-0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0014







R2 Within 0.2372 0.5256 0.5055 0.6198 0.6243 0.6243
Observations 384 384 335 335 332 332
Groups 228 228 228 228 227 227
Demographics includes  average age, average schooling , average schooling squared, fraction of fermales. ** 
5% significance, * 10% significance.
Table 4: Fixed effect estimation







A more consistent procedure when there is correlation between the fixed effect
and the explicative variables are the Hausman and Taylor estimators. This procedure is aDOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 295 13
two-stage error component procedure in which the set of instruments is composed by the
within variation of exogenous and endogenous explicative variables (in relation to the
fixed-effect component), plus the between variation of the exogenous explicative
variables. Those instruments are orthogonal to the error term in equation (1) because the
within variation of endogenous variables by definition is orthogonal to the fixed-effect
component. Those instruments are used in a two-stage least-square regression of the
random-effect GLS panel method. This procedure is consistent and more efficient than
the Fixed Effect estimator.
Table 5 shows the results when the Hausman and Taylor procedure is used. As in
the within estimation, the coefficient of all the variables remains quite constant after
introducing output gap.  In addition, now the “crime rate” and “mayor” variables are
significant (with correct signs) while poverty is marginally significant. Finally, the
Hausman test run in those models confirms that the problem of no orthogonality between
the fixed effect and the explanatory variables is corrected.
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6
-4.0135 -3.2279 -1.7805 -1.5548 -1.5442 -1.3820
(-4.47)** (-6.91)** (-8.89)** (-8.55)**  (-7.05)** (-5.92)**
0.1158 0.0873 0.0684 0.0631 0.0622 0.0573
(2.85)** (4.13)** (8.10)** (8.37)** (7.10)** (6.08)**
Demographics NO YES YES YES YES YES
-0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0016







R2 Overall 0.0062 0.149 0.0097 0.004 0.0067 0.0312
Within 0.2371 0.5098 0.5049 0.619 0.6164 0.6027
Between 0.0328 0.0098 0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 0.003
Observations 384 384 335 335 335 332
Groups 228 228 228 228 228 227
0.56 6.84 0.21 0.33 3.41 8.27
Propb 0.99 Prob 0.335 Prob 0.99 Prob 0.99 Prob 0.94 Prob 0.60
Demographics include average age, average schooling, average schooling squared, fraction of females. ** 5% 
significance, * 10% significance.
Table 5: Hausman Taylor estimation
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4.  ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
The results in Table 5 indicate that the coefficient of the unemployment rate is
negative and significant and the coefficient of the square of the unemployment rate is
positive and significant. This means that the higher the rate of unemployment, the lower
the vote of the incumbent. The relationship is not linear since the effect declines as the
unemployment rate increases. The average unemployment rate in the Chilean economy
in 1989-2003 was 8%. Our results predict that if the unemployment rate increases from
8% to 9%, the incumbent’s vote in a presidential elections will decline by 0.4 percentage
points. On the other hand, if the unemployment rate decreases from 8% to 7%, the vote
for the incumbent will increase by 0.53 percentage points. In 1999, the unemployment
rate in Chile was 9.8% while in 1993 it was 6.5%. This factor alone explains a decline of
1.5 percentage points in  the vote for the incumbent.
Our results regarding the output gap suggest that for each percentage point that
the GDP is above its trend, the vote for the incumbent will increase by 0.6 percentage
points. It has been estimated2 that in 1993, the GDP was 4.7% above the GDP trend
while in 1999, it was 2% below the trend. This factor alone explains another decrease of
four percentage points in the vote for the incumbent in the presidential election in 1999
as compared to the presidential election in 1993. The unemployment rate and the output
gap together add up to a decline in the vote of 5.5 percentage points for the incumbent
between the presidential election in 1993 and the presidential election in 1999.
It is interesting to note that the rest of the variables are significant and have the
expected sign. The higher the crime rate and the poverty rate, the lower the vote for the
incumbent. The political party of the mayor, on the other hand, appears to have an effect
on the vote in presidential elections. If the mayor belongs to the coalition of the
incumbent, then there is a positive effect on the vote for the candidate of the government
coalition in that municipality.
We tested several lags for the different variables but they were not significant.
This supports the idea that the economic events that influence political elections are the
current events rather than the lagged events.
                                                                
2 Ministry of Finance (2004).DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 295 15
5.  CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper has been to investigate whether, and to what extent,
economic variables affect political elections. Our results indicate that the unemployment
rate and the output gap have a significant effect on the votes obtained by the incumbent.
More specifically, an increase of 1% in the unemployment rate has an effect of about 0.5
percentage points on the vote of the incumbent (a non-linear effect). On the other hand,
for each percentage point that the economy is above its trend, the vote for the incumbent
will increase by 0.6 percentage points. These results allow us to estimate that the
worsening of the economic conditions between the presidential elections of 1993 and
1999 reduced the vote for the incumbent by 5.5 percentage points.
Our estimations also indicate that variables such as the crime rate, the poverty
rate and the political coalition of the mayor in each municipality have an influence on
the vote.16 BUSINESS CYCLE AND POLITICAL ELECTION OUTCOMES
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